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ORDERING PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
OF PERSONAL INJURY PLAINTIFFS
In a damage suit for personal injuries the physical or mental
condition of the plaintiff is frequently in dispute. To enable the
court and the defendant to evaluate the claim the plaintiff asserts,
it may be essential to have the plaintiff examined by a court-appointed
physician. In some instances the plaintiff will voluntarily submit to the
examination but, if he refuses, the question arises as to whether the
court has the power to order him to submit to the physical examina-
tion.'
The court's power to order a physical examination of the plaintiff
was recently considered by Oklahoma in Witte v. Fullerton.2 The de-
fendant in a personal injury suit filed a "Motion for Physical Exami-
nation" in which he requested the court to order the plaintiff to
submit to a physical examination by a doctor appointed by the court.
The defendant contended that he could not determine the truth of
the plaintiff's claim of injury without such an examination. However,
the trial court, relying on previous decisions of the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma overruled the motion. The defendant took exception
to this ruling and appealed to the Supreme Court. After reviewing its
prior holdings, denying the power of trial courts to order physical
examinations and weighing current legal thought on the question,
the court abandoned its prior stand. The court stated that "in all
cases tried subsequent to the issuance of the mandate in this case,
the trial court upon timely request therefor, shall have the discretion-
ary power to require the plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit
to a physical examination."' 3 The court expressly overruled its earlier
decision announced in City of Kingfisher v. Altizer. 4
The decision in Witte v. Fullerton5 aligns the Oklahoma courts
with a majority of jurisdictions6 which hold that the courts have in-
Field & Kaplan, Civil Procedure 49 (1953).
2376 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1962).
3id. at 248.
'13 Okla. 121, 74 Pac. 107 (1903).
rSupra note 2.
6Alabama G. So. Ry. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 8 So. go (189o); Johnston v. Southern
Pac. Co., 15o Cal. 535, 89 Pac. 348 (1907); Western Glass Mfg. Co. v. Schoeninger,
42 Colo. 357, 94 Pac. 342 (1908); Cook v. Miller, 1o Conn. 267, 13o At. 571
(1925); People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 1o Ill. 2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 78o (1957);
Shroeder v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 47 Iowa 375 (1877); Jerobek v. Safeway Cab,
Transfer & Storage Co., 146 Kan. 859, 73 P.2d 1097 (1937); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Beeler, 142 Ky. 772, 135 S.W. 3o5 (19ni); Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39,
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herent power to order the plaintiff in a personal injury action to
submit to a physical examination. A few jurisdictions cling to the
old view refusing to recognize any such inherent right in the courts.7
Although later changing to the majority view, the United States Su-
preme Court, in an early decision on the question of the examination
order, found the minority position a sound one.8 This Court like other
courts adhering to the minority view, considered the ordered examina-
tion a trespass to the person. The Court stated:
"The inviolability of the person, is as much invaded by a
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any
one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit
to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an in-
dignity, an assault and a trespass..."0
The thought that the physical examination amounts to a trespass
is forcefully countered by the theory of implied consent advanced by
a majority of courts.1 0 According to the majority, a plaintiff who seeks
justice from the courts and places his physical condition in issue,
"impliedly consents" to the doing of justice; and justice may necessi-
tate the plaintiff's making relevant disclosures including disclosures
arrived at through physical examination." A plaintiff is permitted to
have himself examined by as many friendly physicians as he pleases,
calling them as expert witnesses at the trial as he sees fit. If the defen-
dant is denied a similar right, the court may get a clouded picture
of the merits of the plaintiff's case, and the defendant may be left at
the mercy of the witnesses whom the plaintiff wishes to call.1 2
The purpose of allowing the pre-trial medical examination is to
t36 At. 3o (1927); Reid v. Middleton, 211 Miss. 324, 13o So. 2d 554 (1961); State
ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMullan, 297 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957); State ex
rel. Parmenter v. Troup, 98 Neb. 333, 152 N.W. 748 (1915); Murphy v. Southern
Pac. Co., 31 Nev. 120, 101 Pac. 322 (1909); Drake v. Bowles, 97 N.H. 471, 92 A.2d 161
(1952); Holton v. Janes, 25 N.M. 374, 183 Pac. 395 ('919); Heton v. J. P. Stevens Co.,
254 N.C. 321, ns8 S.E.2d 791 (1961); Brown v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry, 12 N.D. 61,
93 N.W. 153 (19o3); Steele v. True Temper Corp., 86 Ohio L. Abs. 276, 174 N.E.2d
298 (C.P. ig6i); Carnine v. Tibbetts, 158 Ore. 21, 74 P.2d 974 (1937); Williams
v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915); Lane v. Spokane
Falls & No. Ry., 21 Wash. 119, 57 Pac. 367 (1899); O'Brien v. City of LaCrosse, 99
Wis. 421, 75 NAV. 81 (1898).
'Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry. & Light, 142 La. 879, 77 So. 777 (1918); Cornell
v. Great No. R.R., 57 Mont. 177, 187 Pac. 9o2 (1920); Sharp v. Ogden Rapid Transit
Co., .18 Utah 481, 16o Pac. 438 (1916).
"Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1890).
"Id. at 252.
'0Supra note 6.
uWanek v. City of Winona, 78 Minn. 98, 8o N.W. 851 (1899).
'-Id. at 852.
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enable the defendant to prepare an intelligent and informed defense' 3
and, at the same time, clearly bring into focus the issues that the
court must decide.14 Also, the physical examination should aid the
court in assessing damages and enlighten the defendant as to the ex-
tent and permanency of the plaintiff's injuries for the purpose of
settlement or possibly for exposing exaggerated or fraudulent claims.
The court's power to order a physical examination is an effective tool
for ascertaining the authenticity of the plaintiff's claim. To deny a
court this power may be to accept approximate justice when something
better is available.' 5 In dealing with the question of the physical
examination order, the court in Schroeder v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
R.R.16 stated succinctly the proposition that "while the law is satisfied
with approximate justice where exact justice cannot be attained, the
courts should recognize no rules which stop at the first when the sec-
ond is in reach."' 17
While under the majority view a physical examination can be
ordered by the court, such is not an absolute right of the defendant.' 8
The order is granted only when the court, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, considers the examination necessary.19 The court does not compel
"St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller, 138 Ill. 465, 28 N.E. o91 (18gi); McGovern
v. Hope, 63 N.J.L. 76, 42 At. 830 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Roskovics v. Ashtabula Water
Works Co., 16 Ohio Op. 2d 297, 174 N.E.2d 295 (C.P. g6i).
14State ex rel. Carter v. Call, 64 Fla. 144, 59 So. 789 (1912); City of Valparaiso
v. Kinney, 75 Ind. App. 66o, 131 N.E. 237 (1921).
nCarnine v. Tibbetts, 158 Ore. 21, 74 P.2d 974 (1937).
"'47 Iowa 375 (1877)-
17Id. at 379.
'Isn Belt Elec. Line Co. v. Allen, 102 Ky. 551, 44 S.W. 89, 90, (1898), the court
concluded:
"(1) that trial courts have the power to order surgical examinations by experts
of the person of a plaintiff who is seeking to recover for personal injury;
"(2) that the defendant has no absolute right to have an order made to that
end, but that a motion therefor is addressed to the sound discretion of the court;
"(3) that the exercise of that discretion will be reviewed on appeal, and cor-
rected in case of abuse;
"(4) that the examination should be ordered and had under the direction and
control of the court, whenever it fairly appears that the ends of justice require
the disclosure or more certain ascertainment of facts which can only be brought
to light or fully elucidated by such an examination, and that the examination
may be made without danger to the plaintiff's life or health, and without inflic-
tion of serious pain;
"(5) that the refusal of a motion, when the circumstances present a reasonably
clear case for examination under the rules stated, is such an abuse of the discretion
lodged in the trial court as will demand a reversal of a judgment in plaintiff's
favor."
'9Cook v. Miller, 1o3 Conn. 267, 13o At. 571 (1925); Southern Grocery Stores v.
Cain, 54 Ga. App. 48, 187 S.E. 250 (1936); Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Griswold, 72
Ind. App. 265, 125 N.E. 783 (192o); Fritchman v. Chitwood Battery Co., 134 Kan.
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the plaintiff, as by contempt proceedings, to submit to the examina-
tion;20 the plaintiff is merely offered the alternative of reasonable
examination or of having his suit dismissed.21 In deciding whether
to grant the examination order the court will weigh the extent of
the information likely to be obtained or elucidated by the examina-
tion.2 2 In addition to the above criterion, and even more important,
the court will decide whether the examination can be made without
serious pain being inflicted upon the plaintiff23 and whether it can be
made without endangering his life or health.
24
The examination order is now within the power of the federal
courts, being provided for in Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 25 and in some states authorized by statute.26 In a recent
Virginia decision interpretating Rule 3:2 3 (d) of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the court said that the purpose
of the rule providing for medical examination was not to create a final
arbiter of medical disputes or to provide a new method of settling
conflicts between medical witnesses. The court stated that the rule was
designed to preserve to the defendant the right to have an injured
727, 8 P.2d 368 (1932); Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39, 136 At. 30 (1927);
Atkinson v. United Ry., 286 Mo. 634, 228 S.W. 483 (1921); Ziskovsky v. Miller, 120
Neb. 255, 231 N.W. 8o9 (1930); Flythe v. Eastern Carolina Coach Co., 195 N.C. 777,
t43 S.E. 865 (1928); Brenne v. Hecox, 129 Ore. 210, 277 Pac. 99 (1929); Schroth v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 280 Pa. 36, 124 At. 279 (1924).
2Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915).
"Compare Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La. App. 187, 123 So. 166 (1929). Louisiana has
not adopted the majority position but applies a variation of the majority rule. In
the Bailey case the court stated that in a personal injury action where the plain-
tiff declines before trial to permit defendant's physicians to make a physical ex-
amination of the plaintiff, the plaintiff will not be allowed to present his medical
testimony as to the extent of his injuries.
2In Roskovics v. Ashtabula Water Works Co., 16 Ohio Op. 2d 297, 174 N.E.2d
295 (C.P. 1961)) the court explained that while the granting of the motion for
physical examination is discretionary, the trial court should guard against going
beyond the necessities of the case.
2Carnine v. Tibbetts, i58 Ore. 2, 74 P.2d 974 (1937).
2 0'Brien v. City of LaCrosse, 99 Wis. 421, 75 N.W. 81 (1898).
2Fed. R. Civ. P. 35. But see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)
which holds that Rule 35 is limited by Rule 37 (b) (2) (iv.), which exempts from
punishment, as for contempt, the refusal to obey an order that a party submit to
a physical or mental examination. Remedies for a party's refusal to submit to a
physical examination are outlined in Rule 37 (b) (2) (i) (ii) (iii).
O'Reed v. Marley, 230 Ark. 135, 321 S.W.2d 193 (1959); Harabedian v. Superior
Ct., 195 Cal. App. 2d 26, 15 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Modesta, 107 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Virginia Linen
Serv., Inc. v. Allen, 198 Va. 700, 96 S.E.2d 86 (1957)-
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